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The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to determine empirically whether there
is a unique regional model of foreign direct investment (FDI) somewhere in the
Asia–Pacific region, driven by complex ‘network’ behaviour of multinational
corporations. The second is to determine empirically whether the investment provisions
of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have had any influence on this regional
investment behaviour. The results suggest that the answer to the first question is
affirmative and the answer to the second is negative. They show that when FDI and
trade are sufficiently driven by fundamentals, as in Asia, the resulting network patterns
of investment do not need to be boosted by investment provisions of PTAs. Further,
the network patterns can be sufficiently strong to insulate a country from investment
diversion when the FDI source countries play the PTA game elsewhere. So the
investment provisions of PTAs pose neither a threat nor a promise to FDI in the Asian
region. But a very real threat may come from the trade provisions of PTAs.
Introduction
Time was when investment was investment, and trade was trade, and the contribution of each
to economic development was examined separately. Foreign direct investment was to be
encouraged by having a good investment climate, because investment added to the stock of
resources for economic development. Trade was to be encouraged by having an open trading
regime, because trade provided the discipline of competition, ensuring the most efficient use
of the resources available.
Now it is recognised that foreign direct investment and trade respond jointly to the
complex forces of economic geography. Both phenomena reflect ‘a tug of war between forces
that tend to promote geographical concentration and those that tend to oppose it — between
“centripetal” and “centrifugal” forces’ (Krugman 1998: 8). And the key players making the
balancing decisions that determine the resulting trade and investment flows are multinational
corporations.
Centripetal forces tend to ensure that economic activity is concentrated. Centripetal
forces include large local markets (which create both backward and forward linkages), thick
labour markets, and pure external economies (such as information spill-overs). In an2
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international context, an important centripetal force is plant-level economies of scale. These
provide an incentive to concentrate production in a particular location and serve other markets
via international trade.
Centrifugal forces tend to ensure that economic activity is dispersed. Centripetal forces
include immobile factors (for example, skilled labour, land) whose shortage may bid up factor
prices and restrict further concentration, and purely external diseconomies (for example,
congestion). In an international context, two important centrifugal forces are transport costs
(both trade barriers and shipping costs) that make it relatively expensive to serve a market
via trade, and differences in factor endowments, which may make it expensive to concentrate
all stages of production at home. A final important factor is firm-level economies of scale,
which mean that even if economic activity is geographically dispersed, it is still carried out by
the same firm, hence promoting foreign direct investment (FDI).
Early models of multinational behaviour that reflected a balancing of these forces were
models of horizontal and vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI was ‘market seeking’. It reflected a
desire to place economic activity close to markets, so as to minimise trade costs. Vertical FDI
was ‘factor seeking’. It reflected a desire to carry out the unskilled labour-intensive elements
of production in locations with relatively abundant unskilled labour.
Early examples of literature that explained the behaviour of multinationals in these terms
included Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984). These models forced FDI to take one or
the other of these forms. More recent studies have integrated the two motivations for FDI,
particularly in the ‘knowledge capital’ model of FDI by Markusen (1997, 2002).
But anecdotal evidence suggests that these characterisations of multinational behaviour
may be too simplistic. For example, Victor Fung, a Hong Kong clothing and textile executive,
no longer describes himself as being in the textile and clothing business, but rather in the
supply chain management business. He describes how his company may divide the production
process for a particular clothing order into six or more steps in different countries throughout
the East Asian region, and will re-optimise the supply chain for each new order. He describes
this process as the ‘democratisation’ of the global production system, where every economy
has a place (Fung 2005). Further, firms such as his may invest in some countries, and deal
at arms length in others. This behaviour is better described in network terms, rather than as
simple horizontal or vertical FDI.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to determine empirically whether there
is a unique regional model of FDI (somewhere) in the Asia–Pacific region, driven by such
‘network’ behaviour. This question is examined by estimating a theoretical model of FDI that
can account for such behaviour, and ascertaining whether it fits FDI patterns in the Asian
region better than elsewhere. The second purpose is to determine empirically whether the
investment provisions of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have had any influence on this3
No. 358, 2006
regional investment behaviour. This question is examined by including measures of the extent
of investment provisions in the estimated model of FDI. The results suggest that the answer
to the first question is affirmative and the answer to the second is negative. By comparing this
behaviour to that in other regions, the paper draws conclusions about fruitful directions for
future regional integration initiatives.
Theoretical models of FDI
Some recent empirical studies of the determinants of FDI have used a gravity model
specification of investment (for example, Stein and Daude 2001, Yeyati, Stein and Daude
2003, Bevin and Estrin 2004, Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004a, Dee and Gali 2005). In this
model, investment is driven by the sizes of the sending and receiving countries and by the
distance between them, where the latter is a proxy for total transport costs. The justification
is a loose one — since models of trade in differentiated products provide theoretical backing
for a gravity model specification of trade, and since such models also explain FDI, they
therefore provide backing for a gravity model specification of investment. The arguments
recognise that trade and investment are linked, and can be either substitutes or complements,
but the arguments are largely informal.
More recently, ‘post-gravity’ empirical specifications of the determinants of FDI have
been drawn from formal analytical models in which decisions to trade or invest are made
endogenously, based on such factors as economies of scale and transport costs. Seminal
studies in this vein are Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2002),
Blonigen and Davis (2000), Blonigen Davies and Head (2003), Blonigen and Davies (2004),
and Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2003). Simulations of the formal analytical models provide
testable hypotheses that are then tested econometrically using real world data. Blonigen and
Davies (2000) do a head-to-head comparison of the Markusen and Maskus (MM)
specification with a gravity model and find that MM model consistently fits the data better.1
Most models of either form find that the investment provisions of PTAs boost FDI
activity.2 However, most ‘post-gravity’ specifications are based on a relatively simple, single-
stage representation of production in a two-country framework, ruling out the possibility of
the network pattern described by Victor Fung. Their findings of a positive effect of the FDI
provisions of PTAs could be the result of mis-specification of the underlying investment
behaviour, or alternatively, of a naïve specification of the investment provisions of PTAs.
Further, most tests of the post-gravity specifications have been made using data sets that
describe FDI into and out of the United States. This is because the United States is one of
the few countries to collect systematic data on the activities of foreign affiliates. However, the
behaviour of US multinationals investing abroad, or of other multinationals investing in the4
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United States, need not be representative of multinational activity in the region more
generally.
Very recently, a new class of analytical models has allowed for more ‘complex’ patterns
of trade and investment (Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen 2003, Grossman, Helpman and
Szeidl 2003, Yeaple 2003, Egger, Larch and Pfaffermayr 2004, Baltagi, Egger and
Pfaffermayr 2005). These could potentially provide a richer specification of the determinants
of FDI, taking account of its network characteristics and its interactions with trade flows. Of
these specifications, the Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005) model is the most promising,
because it allows for two-stage production in a three-country framework. It therefore makes
provision analytically for a network pattern of trade and investment, and so is less likely to
suffer mis-specification bias.
In this model, four types of ‘complex’ FDI are possible, depending on the combinations
of relative factor endowments, transport costs, and economies of scale. Taking d as the parent
country, i as the host country and j as the third country, the investment patterns of the parent
country can be
• horizontal — plants in d and i, with exports from d to j
• export platform (complex horizontal) — plants in d and i, with exports from i to j
• vertical — plants in i and j, with exports from i to d
• complex vertical — plants in i and j, with exports from j to d.
These authors make clear that the complex vertical pattern is also underpinned by
exports from i to j, so this pattern corresponds closely to that described by Victor Fung. If
export platform FDI was accompanied by exports from j to d it could also correspond to a
network pattern, differing only from complex vertical FDI in that the interaction between d
and j was arms-length via trade, rather than via FDI. However, other motivations may also
be present in the Asia–Pacific region.
One of the strengths of this framework is that it shows how the incentives for parent
d to invest in host i depend not just on the characteristics of the particular host i, but also on
the characteristics of other countries in the network j. Indeed, the so-called third-country
effects play an important role in being able to infer which type of investment is taking place
between d and i.
Using simulations of their analytical model, these authors show that all four types of
bilateral FDI between d and i should be expected to increase with bilateral total size, with the
parent-to-host capital endowment ratio (Kd/Ki), with the parent-to-host skilled labour ratio5
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(Hd/Hi), and to decrease with the unskilled labour ratio (Ld/Li). The effects of similarity in
size between d and i are mixed.3
Thus far there are no clear predictions about the mathematical signs of particular
determinants that can be used to distinguish which type of FDI is taking place. However, two
interaction terms are important. The first is between the d-to-i capital endowment ratio and
bilateral size. This captures the fact that d’s capital abundance is more in favour of bilateral
FDI at larger bilateral size. The second interaction term is the product of log differences in
relative factor endowments and log transport costs. This accounts for the fact that an increase
in transport costs would lead to more horizontal-type investment (simple or complex) and less
vertical-type investment.
The third-country effects also help to distinguish which type of investment is occurring
between d and i. In general terms, the third-country effects reflect a trade-off between
demand and supply effects. The bigger j is, the more it is likely to appeal as an alternative base
for investment, in order to serve the local market directly. However, such relocation also
depends on supply factors — on j’s factor endowments relative to i, but also on j’s supply of
exports to d and i. The pattern of expected third-country effects are reported, along with own
country effects, in Table 1. As noted, the signs of the third-country effects are useful ways
to distinguish which type of bilateral FDI is occurring between d and i.
For estimation purposes, the framework of the Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005)
model has been extended in two ways. The first is to include distance as an explicit additional
determinant of bilateral FDI, as was done in Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004b). Greater
distance between d and i would increase the cost of serving i’s market via exports (thus
promoting FDI), but it may also increase the set-up costs of establishing a branch in i (thus
reducing FDI). Hence the sign of this variable is ambiguous, irrespective of the type of FDI
taking place. However, its inclusion will reduce the risk of mis-specification, and hence reduce
the risk of mis-attributing the potential effects of PTAs.
Finally, the framework has been expanded to include index measures of the investment
provisions of any PTAs between d and i (own-country effects) and d and j (third-country
effects). In estimating their framework, Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005) made
provision for spatial correlation in error terms. One obvious source of such spatial correlation
is the existence of PTAs. Hence, in the current specification, this effect has been incorporated
deterministically, using index measures of the provisions of PTAs.
Thus the full specification used for estimation purposes is as follows:
Ft = β0 + β1dis + β2Gt + β3St + β4kt + β5ht + β6lt +β7gammat + β8phit + β9risk + β10Pt
+ β11wGt + β12wSt + β13wkt + β14wht + β15wlt + β16wgammat + β17wphit + β18wrisk
+ β19wPt + ut6
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where
Ft is the log of the bilateral stock of outward FDI from parent d to host i in year t
dis is the distance between d and i
Gt = ln(GDPd + GDPi) is a measure of absolute bilateral country size in year t
St = (1–sd 2–si
2) where sd=GDPd/(GDPd+GDPi) and si= GDPi/(GDPd+GDPi) is a
measure of similarity in country size in year t
kt = ln(Kd/Ki);           ht = ln(Hd/Hi);           lt = ln(Ld/Li)
gammat = Gt kt      phit = ln(dis)(kt – lt)
Table 1 Expected signs of determinants of complex FDI from d to i
                        Mode of FDI
Explanatory variable Horizontal Export platform Vertical Complex vertical
Bilateral changesa
dis = distance between d and i +/- +/- +/- +/-
G = bilateral size of d plus i + + + +
S = similarity in size of d and i +/- + -/ + +/-
k = ln(Kd/Ki)+ + + +
h = ln(Hd/Hi)+ + + +
l = ln(Ld/Li)- - - -
gamma = G*k + + + -
phi = ln(dis)*(k-l) + + - +/-
risk rating of i + + + +
FTA lib’n between d and i:
- cross-border trade +/- +/- +/- +/-
- investment + + + +
- movement of people +/- +/- +/- +/-
Third-country changesb
wG = bilateral size of d and j + + + +
wS = similarity in size of d and j + + +/- +/-
wk = ln(Kd/Kj)- + + -
wh = ln(Hd/Hj)+ + - -
wl = ln(Ld/Lj)+ - + -
wgamma = wG*wk + + - +
wphi = ln(disdj)*(wk-wl) + + +/- +
Wrisk = risk rating of j - - - +/-
FTA liberalisation between d and j:
- cross-border trade +/- +/- +/- +/-
- investment - - - +/-
- movement of people +/- +/- +/- +/-
Notes: a d is parent, i is host and j is third country.
b Predicted signs of wG to wphi are based on reasonably low values of transport costs.
Source: Based on Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005).7
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risk is a measure of country investment risk in host i
Pt is one or more index variables measuring the strength of the investment provisions
of any PTA in place between d and i in year t.
The remaining variables, prefixed with w, measure third-country effects. These are
measured as the inverse distance-weighted averages of the corresponding variables between
the same parent d and all of its other third-country hosts j in year t. Thus, for example, wGt
is a weighted average of ln(GDPd + GDPj) over all of d’s other host countries j, where the
weights are the inverse of distance between d and j. This is based on the idea that the strength
of third-country effects is likely to decay with distance, as found in Egger and Pfaffermayr
(2004b). In addition, as in the Baltagi Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005) model, the specification
includes a measure of host-country investment risk.
This specification is estimated on a panel of annual data covering up to 32 parent
countries and up to 109 hosts over the period 1988–1997. Not all parents or hosts are present
in the sample in all years, so the panel is highly unbalanced. But when a parent country appears
in a given year, its hosts in that year are reasonably representative. Hence the measures of
third-country effects are also representative. The entire data-set has 5,826 observations. The
data sources and countries are listed in the data annex.
The real-world data on which the specification is estimated clearly violate the analytical
model of Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005) in several key respects. Their model predicts
that multinationals will only arise in countries that are well endowed with capital and skilled
labour. Yet in the real world, countries such as Malaysia and Thailand invest non-trivial
amounts in locations like the United States, despite having an absolute disadvantage in both
capital and skilled labour. How to treat this issue seems to be at the heart of the debate between
Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003) and Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2003) about whether
relative endowments should be measured as simple or absolute differences. The approach
here is to note that even in the simple Heckscher-Ohlin framework, notions of relative factor
abundance become slippery, ‘on-average’ concepts once the model is extended beyond two
goods and two factors. However, it is reasonable to suppose that countries such as Malaysia
and Thailand will invest more in the United States as their absolute disadvantage in capital or
skilled labour lessens. This is consistent with the empirical specification used by Baltagi, Egger
and Pfaffermayr and shown above, where relative endowments are measured using simple
rather than absolute differences.
The first research task is to estimate the above specification on various country
groupings, to see if particular patterns of FDI can be discerned for that grouping, on the basis
that the signs of the coefficients for that grouping follow one or more of the patterns identified
in Table 1. The second research task is to see whether the measures P or wP have any
significance.8
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The expected effects of investment provisions of PTAs
If P is significant, it means that the bilateral FDI between parent d and host i is significantly
affected by the investment provisions of PTA agreements signed between d and i. Potentially,
then, this variable can measure gross ‘investment creation’ between the parties to a PTA,
although as shall be seen shortly, whether ‘creation’ or ‘destruction’ is expected depends on
the type of provision.
If wP is significant, it means that the bilateral FDI between parent d and host i is
significantly affected by the investment provisions of PTA agreements signed between d and
its other investment partners j. Potentially, then, this variable can measure ‘investment
diversion’, although once again, the expected sign depends on the type of provisions.
How should we characterise the investment provisions of PTAs? This is not straight-
forward, because of the variety of ways in which investment provisions are incorporated in
PTAs. Firstly, there are (at least) two broad types of agreements:
• GATS-style agreements follow the architecture of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
under the WTO. Investment provisions typically only cover FDI in services — this is because
commercial presence is one of the modes by which services are traded. Further, GATS-style
agreements are typically positive-list agreements, so only those particular services sectors that are
nominated by a member country are bound by the provisions of the agreement.
• NAFTA-style agreements follow the architecture of the NAFTA agreement between Canada,
Mexico and the United States. These agreements typically have one chapter covering cross-
border trade in services and a separate chapter covering investment in all sectors. Further, NAFTA-
style agreements are typically negative-list agreements, so all sectors are automatically covered by
the provisions of an agreement unless a member indicates otherwise in an annex of reservations
and exclusions.
In addition to these (and a host of other) architectural issues governing the form of an
agreement, there are also issues of content. A negative-list architecture may appear to
guarantee a relatively liberal agreement, but this need not be the case in practice if the
participants append lengthy lists of reservations and exclusions.
For the current exercise, the services and investment provisions of PTAs have been
‘mapped’ using the templates outlined in Tables 2–4. The first table covers the provisions
governing the cross-border trade in services (modes 1 and 2 in GATS terminology), the
second covers the provisions governing investment (GATS mode 3) and the third covers the
provisions governing the movement of natural persons (GATS mode 4). Within each table,9
No. 358, 2006
Continued on page 10
Table 2 Template for scoring cross-border trade in services
Category Score
FORM OF AGREEMENT
Scope Covers everything 1
Excludes only air passenger transport or government services 0.8
Excludes air passenger transport and government services (same as
GATS) 0.75
Excludes a little more than GATS (e.g. financial services) 0.5
Excludes a lot more than GATS 0.25
Endeavours with unspecified scope (cooperation or no detailed
provisions) 0.2
No services provisions 0
MFN Negative list bindings 1
Positive list bindings 0.75
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
MFN exemptions None 1
None for new bilateral agreements 0.5
Some for new bilateral agreements 0.25
For all existing and new bilateral agreements or no commitment
on MFN 0
National treatment Negative list bindings 1
Negative list bindings – some sectors 0.75
Positive list bindings 0.5
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
Market access Negative list bindings 1
(i.e. prohibition on Negative list bindings – some sectors 0.75
QRs as in GATS) Positive list bindings 0.5
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
Local presence not Has this provision 1
required (right of Has this provision, but with some exemptions 0.5
non-establishment) Doesn’t have this provision 0
Domestic regulation General provisions as in GATS plus necessity test (or equivalent) 1
General provisions as in GATS (transparency, not a disguised
restriction) 0.75
Measures in a reasonable and impartial manner 0.4
Provisions for specific sectors e.g. professions 0.25
No provisions 0
Transparency Prior comment 0.3
(scores additive) Publish (as in GATS) 0.4
National inquiry point (as in GATS) 0.3
Recognition General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in
international standards) plus provisions for all sectors 110
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Table 2 contd.
Continued on page 11
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based
in international standards) plus provisions for specific sectors 0.75
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in
international standards) 0.5
Provisions for specific sectors e.g. legal, engineering 0.25
Encouragement 0.2
No provisions 0
Monopolies and Stronger than general provisions in GATS 1
exclusive services General provisions as in GATS (not act inconsistently with
providers commitments, not anticompetitive in other markets)  0.75
General provisions as in GATS plus some exceptions 0.6
Provisions for specific sectors e.g. telecommunications 0.5
No provisions 0
Business practices Stronger than the GATS 1
General provisions as in GATS (consult with a view to eliminating) 0.75
Provisions for specific sectors 0.5
No provisions  0
Transfers and No restrictions except to safeguard balance of payments 1
payments Restrictions in other prescribed circumstances 0.5
No provisions 0
Denial of benefits Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial (or any)
(i.e. rules of origin) business operations in other party 1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors 0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors 0.5
Total denial if owned by third party, or no provisions to
prevent denial 0
Safeguards General provisions 0
Provisions for particular sectors 0.25
Future negotiations 0.5
No provisions or banned 1
Subsidies Provisions limiting their use 1
(may be in separate Consultation 0.5
subsidies chapter but Future negotiations to limit their use 0.25
covers services) No provisions 0
Government Provisions on non-discriminatory access 1
procurement in Provisions for access in some sectors 0.75
services (could be in Future negotiations 0.5
separate chapter) No provisions 0
Ratchet mechanism All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound 1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism 0.75
No mechanism 0
Telecommunications Interconnection (access to and use of PSTN and services by
(scores additive) service suppliers of other party) 0.5
Unbundling 0.1
Particular services (e.g. leased circuits, resale, number portability) 0.1
Competitive safeguards 0.1
Universal Service Obligations 0.111
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Table 2 contd.
Allocation of scarce resources (e.g. spectrum) 0.1
Financial services Prudential carve-out 0.4
(scores additive) Provision for recognition of prudential measures 0.2
NT for access to payments and clearing systems 0.1
New financial services 0.1
Privacy 0.1
Data transfer 0.1
CONTENT OF For negative list agreements, look at non-conforming measures
AGREEMENT For positive list agreements, look at specific, horizontal and
MFN commitments.
General  reservations No modes excluded by one or more parties 1
or exceptions – One mode excluded by one or more parties (e.g. mode 4) 0.5
modes Two or more modes excluded by one or more parties, or no
provisions 0
General  reservations No measures (MFN, NT, market access) excluded by one or more parties 1
or exceptions – One measure (e.g. market access) excluded by one or more parties 0.5
measures More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no provisions 0
Sectoral  exclusions No sectors excluded by one or more parties 1
(out of 46 substantive 1-10 sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.8
sectors) (least 11-20 sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.6
generous treatment
among members of 21-30 sectors excluded by one or more parties 0.4
FTA)
31-40 sectors excluded by one or more parties 0.2
More than 40 sectors excluded by one or more parties, or no provisions on
services trade 0
Subnational No measures at sub-national (state or provincial) level excluded 1
exclusions Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties 0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties 0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties, or no
provisions on services trade 0
Other general No other general exclusions 1
exclusions One other exclusion (e.g. for minorities, land purchases) by at least one
party 0.5
Two or more other exclusions (e.g. for minorities, land purchases) by at
least one party 0
Source: Compiled by author.12
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Continued on page 13
Table 3 Template for scoring investment
Category Score
FORM OF AGREEMENT
Sectoral coverage Beyond services (in separate chapter) 1
Services only (mode 3 in services chapter) 0.5
Based on bilateral treaties 0.4
Endeavours without specified scope 0.25
None 0
Scope of MFN, Establishment (i.e. greenfield) 0.3
National Treatment, etc. Acquisition (i.e. merger) 0.2
provisions Post-establishment operation 0.3
(scores additive) Resale (i.e. free movement of capital) 0.2
MFN Negative list bindings 1
Positive list bindings 0.75
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
MFN exemptions None 1
None for new bilateral agreements 0.5
Some for new bilateral agreements 0.25
For all existing and new bilateral agreements, or no provisions
to prevent exemptions 0
National treatment Negative list bindings – all sectors 1
Negative list bindings – some sectors 0.75
Positive list bindings – all sectors 0.5
Best endeavours  0.25
No commitment 0
Nationality Cannot restrict either 1
(residency) of Cannot restrict either, with sectoral exceptions 0.75
management and Can partially restrict board of directors 0.5
board of directors Can partially restrict management or both. Alternatively, sectoral
(including exceptions) promises to liberalise, but no general promise. 0.25
No provisions limiting restrictions 0
Performance No local content, trade or other specified requirements (e.g. on
requirements technology transfer, or where to sell) 1
No local content or trade requirements i.e. as in TRIMS 0.75
Provisions more limited than TRIMS 0.5
No provisions 0
Transparency (in Prior comment 0.3
services or investment Publish (as in GATS) 0.4
chapter (scores additive) National inquiry point (as in GATS) 0.3
Denial of benefits (i.e. Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial (or any) business
rules of origin) operations in other party 1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors 0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors 0.5
Total denial if owned by third party, or no provisions 013
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Expropriation, etc Minimum standard of treatment 0.2
(scores additive) Treatment in case of strife 0.4
Expropriation and compensation 0.4
Transfers and No restrictions except to safeguard balance of payments 1
payments Restrictions in other prescribed circumstances 0.5
No provisions 0
Investor State dispute Yes 1
settlement No 0
Safeguards General provisions 0
Provisions for particular sectors 0.25
Future negotiations 0.5
No provisions 1
Subsidies limiting their use 1
(may be in separate Consultation 0.5
subsidies chapter but Future negotiations 0.25
covers investment)  No provisions 0
Government Provisions on non-discriminatory access 1
procurement Provisions for access in some sectors 0.75
(could be in separate Future negotiations 0.5
chapter) No provisions 0
Ratchet mechanism All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound 1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism 0.75
No mechanism 0
CONTENT OF AGREEMENT
General No measures (MFN, NT, market access) excluded by one or more parties 1
reservations or One measure (e.g. market access) excluded by one or more parties 0.5
exceptions More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no provisions 0
Sectoral  exclusions No sectors excluded by one or more parties 1
(out of 46 substantive 1–10 sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime,
sectors) audiovisual) 0.8
11–20 sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime,
audiovisual)  0.6
21–30 sectors excluded by one or more parties 0.4
31–40 sectors excluded by one or more parties 0 .2
More than 40 sectors excluded by one or more parties, or no
provisions on investment 0
Subnational No measures at sub-national level excluded 1
exclusions Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties 0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties 0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties,
or no provisions on investment 0
Other general No other general exclusions 1
exclusions  No other general exclusions, but some exclusions for some sectors 0.75
One other exclusion (e.g. for minorities, land purchases) by at least
one party 0.5
Two other exclusions (e.g. for minorities, land purchases) by at least
one party, or no provisions on investment 0
Source: Compiled by author.14
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Continued on page 15
Table 4 Template for scoring movement of natural persons
Category Score
FORM OF AGREEMENT
Sectoral coverage Beyond services and investment (separate chapter) 1
Services and investment (in both services and investment chapters) 0.75
Services only (mode 4 in services) 0.5
Endeavours  0.25
None 0
Scope Allows permanent immigration 1
Includes access to labour market 0.75
Temporary movement only 0.5
No clear scope 0.25
None 0
Immigration Requires changes to immigration procedures (e.g. visa quotas or
eligibility criteria) 1
Subject to existing immigration laws and procedures, or no provisions 0
MFN for mode 4 Negative list bindings 1
delivery Positive list bindings 0.75
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
MFN exemptions None 1
None for new bilateral agreements 0.5
Some for new bilateral agreements 0.25
For all existing and new bilateral agreements or no commitment on MFN 0
National treatment for Negative list bindings 1
mode 4 delivery Negative list bindings – some sectors 0.75
Positive list bindings 0.5
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
Market access (i.e. Negative list bindings 1
prohibition on QRs Negative list bindings – some sectors 0.75
as in GATS) Positive list bindings 0.5
Best endeavours 0.25
No commitment 0
Domestic regulation General provisions as in GATS plus necessity test (or equivalent) 1
General provisions as in GATS (transparency, not a disguised restriction) 0.75
Measures in a reasonable and impartial manner 0.4
Provisions for specific sectors e.g. professions 0.25
No provisions 0
Transparency for Prior comment 0.3
mode 4 delivery Publish (as in GATS) 0.4
(scores additive) National inquiry point (as in GATS) 0.3
Transparency for temp. Expedite procedures 0.3
movement of people Publish 0.415
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Continued on page 16
(scores additive) Answer queries or comments 0.3
Recognition General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in
international standards) plus provisions for all sectors 1
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in
international standards) plus provisions for specific sectors 0.75
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in
international standards) 0.5
Provisions for specific sectors e.g. legal, engineering 0.25
Endeavours 0.2
No provisions 0
Denial of benefits Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial (or any)
(i.e. rules of origin) business operations in other party 1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors  0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors 0.5
Total denial if owned by third party or no provisions 0
Ratchet mechanism All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound 1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism 0.75
No mechanism 0
CONTENT OF AGREEMENT–SERVICE DELIVERY
General No measures (MFN, NT, market access) excluded by one or more parties 1
reservations or One measure (e.g. market access) excluded by one or more parties 0.5
exceptions More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no
provisions on movement of people 0
Sectoral  exclusions No sectors excluded by one or more parties 1
(out of 46 substantive 1–10 sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.8
sectors) 11–20 sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual) 0.6
21–30 sectors excluded by one or more parties 0.4
31–40 sectors excluded by one or more parties 0.2
More than 40 sectors excluded by one or more parties, or no
provisions on movement of people 0
Subnational No measures at sub-national level excluded 1
exclusions Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties 0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties 0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties,
or no provisions on movement of people 0
Other general No other general exclusions 1
exclusions One other exclusion (e.g. for minorities, land purchases) by at least
one party 0.5
Two other exclusions (e.g. for minorities, land purchases) by at least
one party, or no provisions on movement of people 0
CONTENT OF AGREEMENT–FACILITATION OF MOBILITY
Skill coverage All groups (including unskilled) 1
(least generous All business persons, traders and investors, intracorporate transferees,
treatment among and professionals 0.5
members of FTA) A subset of the above (e.g. specialists, managers and intracorporate
transferees) 0.25
No groups 0
Short term entry Over 90 days or no time limit mentioned 1
(least generous U p to 90 days 0.75
treatment among Up to 60 days 0.16
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there has been a relatively comprehensive mapping of the form of an agreement, while a few
broad indicators have been selected to gauge the content. Each PTA agreement is then
assigned a numerical score between 0 and 1 against each particular characteristic of form or
content, with higher values indicating a more liberal agreement. These scores are of ordinal
rather than cardinal importance.
The various services provisions covering cross-border trade and the movement of
natural persons have been scored, along with the investment provisions, in order to account
for possible substitution between the different modes of services delivery. If an agreement is
particularly generous in opening up cross-border trade, for example, this could promote
cross-border trade at the expense of delivery via commercial presence, and hence at the
expense of FDI. The provisions governing the movement of natural persons affect the
movement of individual service providers (particularly in the professions) who operate on their
own account. But they also affect the longer-term movement of expatriate employees of
foreign multinationals. Hence more generous provisions on the movement of natural persons
could boost or reduce FDI, depending on the relative importance of mode-3 versus mode-
4 delivery, and on the possibility of substituting between them.
The expected signs of the PTA variables shown in Table 1 reflect the expectation that
more liberal bilateral investment provisions should boost bilateral FDI, while more liberal
third-country investment provisions could reduce FDI. The signs of the provisions governing
cross-border trade and the movement of natural persons are ambiguous, since it is unclear
Table 4 contd.
members of FTA) Up to 30 days 0.25
Unspecified 0.1
No short term entry, or in the case of unbinding service provisions
(e.g. endeavours) 0
Long term entry 5 years or more or no time limit mentioned 1
(least generous Up to 4 years 0.8
treatment among Up to 3 years 0.6
members of FTA) Up to 2 years 0.4
Up to 1 year 0.2
Unspecified 0.1
No long term entry, or in the case of unbinding service
provisions (e.g. endeavours) 0
Quotas on numbers No (or not mentioned) 1
of entrants Yes, or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavours) 0
Local labour market All such tests prohibited or not required 1
testing or other Some such tests prohibited or not required 0.5
Criteria No prohibitions (or not mentioned or in the case of unbinding
service provisions (e.g. endeavours)) 0
Source: Compiled by author.17
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whether these modes of delivery are general equilibrium substitutes for, or complements to,
FDI. While the FDI data cover FDI in all sectors, not just in services, it is widely thought that
services account for at least half of all FDI. So substitution among modes of service delivery
could be expected to show up in the aggregate FDI data.
The scoring has been applied to all the major agreements in force between countries
in the econometric sample in the years leading up to 1997. These agreements are listed in
Table 5. This table also shows the simple average of the scores against all possible services
and investment characteristics for these agreements. The average scores suggest that among
the most liberal agreements are NAFTA and its Latin American clones (particularly that
between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela), the CER agreement between Australia and New
Zealand, and the agreements (EU, EFTA, EEA) among European nations. The Mercosur
agreement among four Latin American countries and the ASEAN Framework Agreement
on Services are also relatively liberal in their architecture, although their sectoral coverage is
very limited.4
A simple average of liberalisation scores gives equal weight to each and every
characteristic. This is most probably inappropriate, and the simple overall average has not
been entered into the econometric specification. Ideally, the score for each characteristic
should be entered separately, and the econometric estimates of the coefficients would then
indicate which (if any) characteristics are significant. At a practical level, the high degree of
multi-collinearity between many individual characteristics means that most of the individual
PTA variables drop out, making it hard to draw any conclusions at all. As an alternative, factor
analysis is used to identify linear combinations of individual characteristics that are not
collinear with each other, but which jointly reproduce most of the variation in the original
characteristics data. This is done separately for the provisions governing cross-border trade,
investment and the movement of natural persons (since the expected signs of these differ) and
for provisions on form and content, leading to 3x2=6 sets of factors. But even here, at least
some of the factors drop out. In the final specification, the PTA variables are simple averages
across these six sets of characteristics — the form and content (respectively) of the provisions
governing cross-border trade, investment and movement of natural persons. This ensures
that most PTA variables stay in the specification, so that lack of significance does not simply
reflect lack of independent in-sample variation.
 The in-sample variation in the PTA variables comes from two sources. Firstly, some
agreements are more liberal than others, and so have higher scores. Second, new agreements
were formed and some existing agreements experienced changes in membership during the
1988–1997 estimation period. So some pairs of countries have a positive value for their
bilateral PTA variables in the years after forming or joining their agreement, but zero values
for the years before. The use of such dynamic PTA dummies has been shown to be important
for properly identifying the effects of PTAs (Dee and Gali 2005).18
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Table 5 PTA agreements and average liberalisation scorea
Agreement Date Membership dynamics Score (0–1)
EEC/EU 1958 Austria (joined 1995), Belgium–Luxembourg, Denmark 0.54
(joined 1973), Finland (joined 1995), France, Germany,
Greece (joined 1981), Hungary (joined 2004), Ireland
(joined 1973), Italy, Netherlands, Poland (joined 2004),
Portugal (joined 1986), Spain (joined 1986), Sweden (joined
1995), United Kingdom (joined 1973).
EFTA 1960 Austria (left 1995), Denmark (left 1972), Finland (joined 0.53
1961, left 1995), Iceland (joined 1970), Norway, Portugal
(left 1985), Sweden (left 1985), Switzerland, United Kingdom
(left 1972).
CACM 1961 Costa Rica (joined 1962), El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua 0.03
EC–Switzerland 1973 EU membership, Switzerland. 0.03
EC–Iceland 1973 EU membership, Iceland 0.03
EC–Norway 1973 EU membership, Norway 0.03
Bangkok  agreement 1976 Bangladesh, China (joined 2001), India, Korea, Lao PDR,  0.03
Sri Lanka
LAIA 1981 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 0.03
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
Sparteca 1981 Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, PNG, Solomon Is. 0.03
US–Israel 1985 Israel, United States 0.03
CER 1989 Australia, New Zealand 0.63
Mercosur 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 0.47
EFTA–Turkey 1992 EFTA membership, Turkey 0.03
CARICOM–Venezuela 1992 Dominican Rep., Venezuela 0.04
Chile–Colombia 1993 Chile, Colombia 0.04
EFTA–Israel 1993 EFTA membership, Israel  0.04
CEFTA 1993 Hungary, Poland 0.03
EFTA–Romania 1993 EFTA membership, Romania 0.04
Chile–Boliviab 1993 Bolivia, Chile 0.08
EEA 1994 EU membership, Iceland, Norway 0.57
NAFTA 1994 Canada (joined precursor in 1988), Mexico, United States 0.60
(joined precursor in 1988)
COMESA 1994 Egypt (joined 1998), Madagascar, Mauritius, 0.08
EC–Romania 1995 EC membership, Romania 0.38
SAPTA 1995 Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 0.03
Bolivia–Mexico 1995 Bolivia, Mexico 0.62
Costa Rica–Mexico 1995 Costa Rica, Mexico 0.59
Colombia–Mexico–
Venezuela 1995 Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 0.67
CARICOM–Colombia 1995 Colombia, Dominican Rep 0.03
ASEAN Framework
Agreement on Services 1995 Indonesia, Lao PDR (joined 1997), Malaysia, Philippines, 0.44
Singapore, Thailand
EC–Turkey 1996 EU membership, Turkey 0.04
Chile–Mercosurb 1996 Mercosur membership, Chile 0.05
Canada–Israel 1997 Canada, Israel 0.03
Israel–Turkey 1997 Israel, Turkey 0.52
Canada–Chile 1997 Canada, Chile 0.62
Bolivia–Mercosurb 1997  Mercosur membership, Bolivia 0.04
Note: a Decision 439 of Andean agreement not signed until 1998.
b Not notified to WTO.
Source: Compiled by author.19
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Is there a regional model of FDI in the Asia–Pacific region?
A key question is where to look — what is the appropriate definition of ‘the region’? Figures
1 to 3 present recent data on inward FDI into various country groupings. Since the theoretical
framework shows that host characteristics play a critical role in FDI, the grouping are of hosts
and for consistency, the host countries are restricted to those that are also represented in the
econometric sample. The inward FDI is from all sources, not just those sources represented
in the econometric sample.
Figure 1 Inward FDI stocks into broad geographic regions
Source: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3199&lang=1.
Figure 2 Inward FDI stocks into socioeconomic groupings of regionsa











































Figure 1 compares the inward FDI stocks into two broad country groupings, Europe
and the APEC region. (APEC members are: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile;
China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua
New Guinea; Peru; The Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; USA and
Viet Nam.) Europe and APEC show a similar pattern, although the growth of FDI stocks
into the APEC region was slightly higher than into Europe. Inward FDI stocks slightly more
than doubled in APEC over the 1990–2000 period, while those in Europe slightly less than
doubled.
Figure 2 compares inward FDI stocks into socioeconomic groupings of countries
(where the lower-income, lower middle-income and upper middle-income groupings follow
the World Bank definitions of these groups). FDI into the two lowest income groupings
roughly trebled, while it roughly quadrupled into the upper middle-income group, over the
1990–2000 period. In all cases, this growth was from a very low base. At the other end of
the spectrum, the FDI into the ‘big eight’ FDI countries grew by about the same rate as into
Europe. These countries — Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States — dominate as the main sources of accumulated
FDI stocks. Figure 2 confirms that they also dominate as destinations of FDI. However, FDI
stocks into the ‘small rich’ countries (developed countries other than the big eight) grew faster
than into the big eight over 1990–2000. They grew slightly faster than into the APEC region
as a whole.
Figure 3 compares inward FDI stocks into smaller ‘geographic’ groupings. FDI stocks
in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, sub-Saharan Africa and South
Figure 3 Inward FDI stocks into ‘geographic’ groupings of regionsa


























Asia are still relatively small, although stocks into sub-Saharan Africa grew two and a half
times, while those into South Asia grew five-fold, over 1990–2000. FDI stocks into Latin
American countries were much more significant, and trebled over the 1990–2000 period.
However, FDI into ‘Asia’ dominated in absolute terms, and grew almost six-fold over 1990–
2000. Here, ‘Asia’ is defined as ASEAN-plus-four — the ASEAN countries plus China,
Hong Kong, Japan and Korea.
These figures suggest that in terms of volumes and growth rates, there is nothing special
about the broad APEC region, although there might be something special about the Asian
grouping of ASEAN-plus-four.
Tables 6–8 present the results of estimating the above specification of the determinants
of FDI separately for each of the same socioeconomic or geographic country groupings of
host countries. All estimating equations also included three types of fixed effects — time
dummies, parent dummies and host dummies — although for brevity the coefficients on these
variables are not reported. The triple indexing approach to fixed effects is advocated by Matyas
(1997, 1998). Hausman tests strongly rejected the alternative, random effects specification
of both parent and host effects. The specifications fit the data far better than a gravity
specification estimated on similar data (Dee and Gali 2005).
In the remainder of this section, the signs of the coefficients on the bilateral and third
country determinants are examined to see if FDI into any of these regions corresponds closely
to one or more of the archetypes of simple or complex horizontal or vertical FDI, as
summarised in Table 1. The next section examines the significance of the variables describing
the investment provisions of PTAs, to see if there is any evidence of investment being ‘created’
or ‘diverted’ by these provisions.
Over the whole sample, distance has a significant negative effect on FDI, as it does for
most host groupings. This suggests that the effect of distance in adding to trade costs, thus
boosting FDI as an alternative way of serving the market, is outweighed by the effect of
distance in adding to the set-up costs of establishing a foreign affiliate.
Over the whole sample, bilateral country size is insignificant, as it is for many host
groupings, despite a strong prediction from the analytical model that it should be positively
associated with FDI, no matter what the motivation for the FDI. Over the whole sample,
relative bilateral factor endowments do not play a particularly strong role — relative capital
stocks matter, but somewhat surprisingly, relative stocks of unskilled labour do not.
The critical interaction and third-country variables suggest that over the whole sample,
the motivations for FDI are mixed. The signs of the own-country interaction variables are
consistent with complex vertical FDI, but the third-country endowment variables suggest an
export platform motivation, while the third-country interaction variables are consistent with22
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Table 6 Econometric results for bilateral FDI stocks into broad regionsa
Dependent variable: Log of outstock from source country; time period
1988–97; unbalanced panel; fixed effects estimation
Variable All hosts Europe APEC
Motives for FDI – bilateral
dis = distance between d and i –0.00018*** –0.00096*** –0.00013***
G = bilateral size of d plus i 0.05 0.11 –0.28*
S = similarity in size of d and i 1.08*** 0.70 0.43
k = ln(Kd/Ki) 1.09*** 2.36***  –0.22
h = ln(Hd/Hi) 0.20 0.04 0.39*
l = ln(Ld/Li) –0.05 3.94***  –2.01***
gamma = G*k  –0.03** –0.22*** 0.04
phi = ln(dis)*(k–l) –0.07*** 0.04 –0.08**
risk 0.39*** –0.72*** 0.10
– third-country
wG = bilateral size of d and j 1.04*** 1.18* 2.08***
wS = similarity in size of d and j –0.31 1.41 7.52***
wk = ln(Kd/Kj) 5.36*** 2.97 5.68***
wh = ln(Hd/Hj) 0.44* 1.05*** –0.12
wl = ln(Ld/Lj) –8.26*** –6.67*** –5.18***
wgamma = wG*wk 0.10 0.11 –0.03
wphi = ln(disdj)*(wk–wl) –0.93*** –0.68** –0.77***
wrisk 0.04 –0.01 –0.18**
FTA variablesb – bilateral
cb_f_ave –1.74* 0.50 Dropped
cb_c_ave 3.61*** –2.44 –10.42***
i_f_ave 5.35*** 0.20 16.22***
i_c_ave 2.20* 1.84 25.29***
mp_f_ave –4.98*** –2.33 9.61***
mp_c_ave –4.63***  2.14 –31.88***
–  third-country
wcb_f_ave 11.01*** 5.44 7.48**
wcb_c_ave 7.12* 12.64** 4.05
wi_f_ave –17.20*** –11.58 –15.18**
wi_c_ave –10.12**  –15.20** –5.22
wmp_f_ave 10.38* 5.18 7.28
wmp_c_ave 0.62  2.70 1.10
Status of FTA variables            Stable                              Unstable                        Unstable
R squared 0.82 0.86 0.83
Reset test – F value 39.99***  58.13*** 21.29***
Notes: a Fixed effects not reported. Estimated using robust standard errors. *** significant at the 1% level;
** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. Reset test Ho: model has no omitted
variables.
b cb = cross-border trade, i = investment, mp = movement of natural persons, f = form, c = content,
ave = average.
Source: Estimated by author.23
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Table 7 Econometric results for bilateral FDI stocks into socioeconomic groupingsa
Dependent variable: Log of outstock from source country, time period 1988–97,
unbalanced panel, fixed effects estimation
Variable Big eight Small rich Upper middle Lower middle Lower
income income income
Motives for FDI – bilateral
dis = distance between d and i –0.00009*** –0.00021*** –0.00011*** –0.00018*** –0.00002
G = bilateral size of d plus i –0.85** –0.64* 0.23 1.31*** 0.89
S = similarity in size of d and i –0.64 0.52 1.55* 2.17*** 0.90
k = ln(Kd/Ki) 2.88** 0.39 4.16***  2.55** 5.16***
h = ln(Hd/Hi) 0.01 –0.07 0.71** –0.24  0.38
l = ln(Ld/Li) 1.52** 1.48** 2.70** –2.81** 0.43
gamma = G*k –0.11** –0.05 –0.13** –0.11** –0.14
phi = ln(dis)*(k–l) 0.19***  –0.01 –0.26*** –0.16*** –0.43***
risk –1.02*** 0.17 0.46*** –0.60 1.31**
–  third-country
wG = bilateral size of d and j –0.80 1.00* 0.85 3.06** –0.61
wS = similarity in size of d and j 9.14*** –2.25 –24.26***  0.73 8.84
wk = ln(Kd/Kj) 3.49 7.24*** 5.04 11.39*** 13.00***
wh = ln(Hd/Hj) 0.09 1.27*** 1.76** –0.41 –0.67
wl = ln(Ld/Lj) –7.18*** –9.20*** –2.42 –6.25* –12.28***
wgamma = wG*wk 0.22 –0.03 –0.49 –0.39 –0.06
wphi = ln(disdj)*(wk–wl) –0.92*** –0.72*** 0.20 –0.88** –1.02***
wrisk –0.13 .27** 0.51** –0.13 0.70***
FTA variablesb – bilateral
cb_f_ave 5.84*** –5.76***          Dropped 766.12***       Dropped
cb_c_ave 10.96*** 8.12*** –3.60 –0.94 –4.29
i_f_ave 12.60*** 11.87*** –28.93** 639.30*** 10.13
i_c_ave 12.21*** –3.18               Dropped      Dropped           Dropped
mp_f_ave                                     Dropped  –13.19*** 8.63 –42.77***      Dropped
mp_c_ave –33.05*** –0.60 23.11 90.32***      Dropped
–  third-country
wcb_f_ave 2.61 13.65*** 30.13*** 3.62 –4.41
wcb_c_ave 11.54** 5.30 –33.15** –8.72 23.93**
wi_f_ave 1.33 –13.75* –81.28*** –12.36 –0.14
wi_c_ave –3.58 –7.07 18.71 26.59** 14.42
wmp_f_ave –10.47 6.03 76.21*** 22.28 –22.34
wmp_c_ave –5.71 –1.62 –0.55 –27.79*** –30.33**
Status of FTA variables        Stable                  Stable             Unstable         Unstable           Unstable
R squared 0.89 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.91
Reset test – F value 27.87*** 29.48*** 4.09*** 3.22** 0.55
Notes: a Fixed effects not reported. Estimated using robust standard errors. *** significant at the 1% level;
** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. Reset test Ho: model has no omitted
variables.
b cb = cross-border trade, i = investment, mp = movement of natural persons, f = form, c = content,
ave = average.
Source: Estimated by author.24
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Table 8 Econometric results for bilateral FDI stocks into ‘geographic’ groupingsa
Dependent variable: Log of outstock from source country, time period 1988–97,
unbalanced panel, fixed effects estimation
Variable MENA Sub-Saharan South Asia Latin America Asia
Africa
Motives for FDI – bilateral
dis = distance between d and i 0.00047*** –0.00037*** –0.00045* –0.00018***–0.00008***
G = bilateral size of d plus i –5.01 4.13*** –0.79 –0.64 0.64*
S = similarity in size of d and i 3.52 .68 –2.68 –0.52 2.38***
k = ln(Kd/Ki) 17.58*** –3.49 .87 –1.29 3.05***
h = ln(Hd/Hi) 0.47 0.34 0.84 –0.06 0.52**
l = ln(Ld/Li) –18.98*** 9.67*** –1.25 1.18 –3.86***
gamma = G*k –0.18 –0.22* 0.15 0.03 –0.15***
phi = ln(dis)*(k–l) –1.65*** 0.80*** 0.05 0.06 –0.17***
risk –0.11 –0.11 1.53 –0.04 0.08
– third-country
wG = bilateral size of d and j 8.01** –0.61 –5.18** 1.35 2.58***
wS = similarity in size of d and j 4.21 54.53*** –0.83 11.64 9.07***
wk = ln(Kd/Kj) –5.01 6.12 3.58 9.89 5.71**
wh = ln(Hd/Hj) –0.06 3.04** –1.00 0.64 –0.18
wl = ln(Ld/Lj) 1.92 –14.06* –20.23*** –6.38 –5.63***
wgamma = wG*wk 0.15 0.59 1.14*** 0.24 –0.02
wphi = ln(disdj)*(wk–wl) 0.48 1.59 –2.30*** –0.47 –0.86***
wrisk 0.03 0.47 0.21 0.59*** –0.27***
FTA variablesb – bilateral
cb_f_ave                               Dropped               Dropped          Dropped          Dropped          Dropped
cb_c_ave                              Dropped               Dropped          Dropped 0.11 8.87
i_f_ave                                 Dropped               Dropped 10.15 –36.21*** –17.79
i_c_ave                                Dropped               Dropped          Dropped          Dropped          Dropped
mp_f_ave                             Dropped               Dropped          Dropped          Dropped          Dropped
mp_c_ave                            Dropped               Dropped          Dropped 32.49**          Dropped
– third–country
wcb_f_ave –2.83 2.76 –37.66*** 7.63 –5.02
wcb_c_ave –18.95  2.08 30.94*–13.92 –8.72
wi_f_ave 36.20 24.95 65.34** –18.74 10.36
wi_c_ave 18.48 –13.90 18.06 22.34 3 4.94***
wmp_f_ave –27.43 –46.27 –66.42 22.06 –7.10
wmp_c_ave –0.43 26.64 –34.48 –16.70 –29.00***
Status of FTA variables     Stable                Stable               Unstable          Stable                Stable
R squared 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.87 0.83
Reset test – F value 4.59*** 3.29** 5.63*** 6.30*** 13.08***
Notes: a Fixed effects not reported. Estimated using robust standard errors. ***significant at the 1% level;
** significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. Reset test Ho: model has no omitted
variables.
b cb = cross-border trade, i = investment, mp = movement of natural persons, f = form, c = content,
ave = average.
Source: Estimated by author.25
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simple vertical FDI. This mixed finding, and lack of significance of some key variables, also
motivates the search for a clearer picture among smaller groupings of host countries.5
A clearer picture fails to emerge when looking at Europe or the broad Asia–Pacific
region. Using the signs of the coefficients that are significant, both regions appear to have
the same mix of motivations as the whole sample. In Europe, perversely, FDI increases with
the relative unskilled labour abundance of the parent country, and decreases as the host
becomes less risky (measured as a higher value of the risk variable). In the Asia–Pacific region,
FDI reduces as bilateral size increases, also contrary to the theoretical framework. This
suggests possible mis-specification of the motivations explaining FDI into Europe and the
broad Asia–Pacific region.
When looking at the big eight investors, the signs of the significant coefficients are
consistent with FDI into the region being driven by vertical or complex vertical motivations,
although this region has the same perverse signs as Europe for unskilled labour and country
risk. It also has a perverse sign on bilateral country size, suggesting that those smaller
countries that ‘return-invest’ into the big eight sources of FDI are not driven by the desire
to defray set-up costs in a big market. Their motivation is more likely to be related to
marketing activity. In the small rich countries, there is little in the bilateral variables to
distinguish the motivation for FDI, although the third-country variables are consistent with
a mix of export platform and vertical motivations. Again, there is a perverse sign on bilateral
country size.
Looking at the three lower socioeconomic groupings, only in the lower middle-income
group does FDI appear to be attracted by the unskilled labour abundance of the host country.
Interestingly, this country grouping includes China. The other variables suggest a mix of
motivations for FDI into the lower middle and lower income groups. They suggest a complex
vertical motivation for FDI into the upper middle-income group, although the lack of
significance of third-country effects means that this evidence is weak.
Turning to smaller ‘geographic’ groupings, there is similar weak evidence of a complex
vertical motivation for FDI into MENA and sub-Saharan African countries, although the
latter group has a perverse sign on the unskilled labour endowment variable. There is no clear
motivation for FDI into South Asia discernable from the third-country interaction variables.
For the Latin American group, there seems little in the new economic geography to
explain FDI into the region. Distance, risk, and unexplained heterogeneity (via the fixed
effects) appear to carry all the explanatory power.26
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By contrast, FDI into the Asian group appears to fit the new economic geography
explanation best. The interaction and third-country variables still suggest a mix of motivations
— complex vertical, simple vertical and export platform. But most of the other variables are
also significant, and none have a perverse sign. In particular, relative endowments of capital,
skilled and unskilled labour all play a role, consistent with fine divisions of comparative
advantage implicit in the network pattern of production and trade described in the
introduction.
Thus it appears that there could be a pattern of FDI unique to the Asian region. This
is not because FDI into the region falls neatly into one of the archetypes of complex FDI
identified by Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005). Rather, it is that FDI in the region
responds relatively clearly to the forces of economic geography that are present in their model,
unimpeded by other considerations. While comparative advantage is an important driving
force, it is mitigated by considerations of economies of scale and transport costs. The resulting
patterns of FDI (and trade) reflect complex horizontal and vertical motivations. This pattern
emerges most clearly for the Asian grouping of ASEAN-plus-four, not for APEC as a whole.
Do the investment provisions of PTAs play a role?
The influence of PTAs is assessed not just by looking at the formal statistical significance of
the PTA variables. They are also subject to considerations of model mis-specification.
Although the empirical specifications include all variables suggested by the formal analytical
model, the Reset tests suggest that with one exception (the lower- income group), some
variables are omitted. Furthermore, the formal tests of significance are made using robust
standard errors, which correct for heteroskedasticity (especially in the variable measuring
bilateral size). But calculating robust standard errors using residuals that include the influence
of omitted variables could mean that the PTA variables appear to be significant, when in reality
they are proxying for omitted variables. Indeed, in several of the specifications, PTA variables
appear significant using robust standard errors, but are insignificant when normal standard
errors are used. Because of their dummy variable nature, the PTA variables are susceptible
to this instability in a way that the other variables are not. Accordingly, Tables 6–8 also report
the status of the PTA variables as being stable or unstable, according to whether the
significance changes when normal rather than robust standard errors are used.
On this basis, attention is paid to the PTA variables for the big eight and small rich
country hosts, and for the developing countries divided along geographic rather than
socioeconomic lines. These are the specifications in which the significance of the PTA
variables is insensitive to the choice of standard errors. The PTA variables have quite different
patterns of significance across these different groupings.27
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FDI into the big eight is positively related to the investment provisions of the PTA
agreements that the big eight sign with the source countries, and is not deflected by the
investment provisions of PTA agreements that those source countries might sign with third
parties. Both the form and the content of the investment provisions matter.6
Furthermore, FDI into the big eight is positively related to the provisions covering
cross-border trade in services in the agreements with source countries, suggesting that cross-
border trade in services and foreign direct investment are general equilibrium complements
rather than substitutes for those source countries. This may not be surprising. Cross-border
trade is an important mode of delivery for services such as insurance, and insurance is a
necessary adjunct activity to many other activities, including FDI in both services and
manufacturing. Finally, FDI into the big eight is negatively related to the content of the
provisions covering the movement of natural persons in the agreements with source countries.
This suggests that the movement of natural persons and FDI are general equilibrium
substitutes for those source countries, in terms of accessing the markets of the big eight. FDI
into the big eight is also boosted by the provisions governing cross-border trade that the
source countries sign with third parties. This probably reflects the headquarters role of the
big eight.
FDI into the small rich countries is positively related to the form of the investment
provisions of agreements that they sign with source countries, and inversely related to the form
of provisions governing cross-border trade and the movement of natural persons, though
positively related to the content of the cross-border provisions. The FDI into small rich
countries is deflected by the form of the cross-border or investment provisions that the source
countries sign with third parties. In the case of the investment provisions, this means that the
FDI into the small rich countries is reduced. The relative magnitudes of the coefficients mean
that if the source countries sign agreements with all third parties that are equally as generous
in the form of their investment provisions as the agreements they sign with each small rich
country, then each small rich country will on average suffer investment diversion that slightly
exceeds investment creation.
FDI into MENA countries and sub-Saharan Africa appears to be unaffected by the
services or investment provisions of PTAs. This is largely because the provisions signed by
these countries to date have been minimal — as reflected by all the bilateral PTA variables
being dropped. By the same token, FDI into these countries is not deflected by the services
and investment provisions of PTAs that source countries might sign elsewhere. The results
are similar for South Asia, although South Asia is somewhat affected by PTAs that its FDI
source countries sign with third parties. However, not all these latter results are robust.
As noted in a previous section, the Latin American countries have signed PTAs that
contain some of the most liberal services and investment provisions. Despite this, the form28
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of those investment provisions seems to deflect rather than attract FDI. The specifications
that use more disaggregated measures of PTA provisions give some small insight into this
result. The negative impact does not come from the provisions governing nationality
requirements, performance requirements, transparency, denial of benefits (that is, rules of
origin, which are typically very liberal for investment), expropriation, investor-state dispute
settlement, government procurement, or the incorporation of a ratchet mechanism. These
are provisions that are given a heavy weight in the second two factors from factor analysis,
whereas it is the first factor (which gives heavy weight to all other provisions governing form)
that is responsible for the negative impact on FDI. However, lack of in-sample variation in
the individual PTA characteristics precludes verifying which particular characteristic is
responsible for this effect.
Finally, FDI into the ASEAN-plus-four group is not significantly affected by the
services or investment provisions of the PTA agreements that these countries sign with source
countries. However, it is positively affected by the investment provisions of the PTA
agreements that the source countries sign with third countries. This is further evidence that
FDI into the Asian grouping has network characteristics. If the PTAs that the source countries
sign with third countries facilitate investment linkages within a network, they can also boost
rather than deflect bilateral investment. Moreover, FDI into the Asian grouping is negatively
affected by the provisions that source countries sign with third parties governing the
movement of natural persons. This is consistent with the movement of natural persons being
a general equilibrium substitute for FDI (as found elsewhere), in the Asian context in which
FDI with third parties is a complement to bilateral FDI within the network.
The estimated effects of the services and investment provisions of PTAs on FDI within
the whole sample can be seen to be dominated by the effects on the FDI into the big eight
and the small rich countries. This is not surprising. What is more revealing from a policy
perspective is to see how the services and investment provisions of PTAs interact with host
country characteristics across the different regional groupings. This is done in the concluding
section.
Conclusions
The first aim of this paper was to determine empirically whether there was a unique regional
model of FDI (somewhere) in the Asia–Pacific (or APEC) region, driven by complex
‘network’ behaviour of multinational corporations. There does appear to be a pattern of FDI
unique to the region. This is not because FDI in the region falls neatly into a single archetypal
pattern, but rather because FDI responds relatively clearly to the forces of economic
geography, unimpeded by other considerations. While comparative advantage is an important29
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driving force, it is mitigated by considerations of economies of scale and transport costs. The
resulting patterns of FDI (and trade) reflect complex horizontal and vertical motivations. This
pattern emerges most clearly for the Asian grouping of ASEAN-plus-four, not for APEC as
a whole.
The second aim of this paper was to determine empirically whether the investment
provisions of preferential trade agreements have had any influence on regional investment
behaviour.
In terms of attracting FDI, the clear winners from the investment and services
provisions of PTAs appear to be the big eight — the countries that are also the main sources
of accumulated FDI. The big eight do not suffer from investment diversion.
The small rich countries have been able to attract FDI by incorporating investment
provisions into PTAs with source countries, although this effect can be offset by provisions
in the same agreements that boost forms of service delivery that substitute for FDI. More
importantly, the small rich countries have suffered investment diversion when the FDI source
countries have incorporated investment provisions into PTAs with third countries.
The African and South Asian groupings of developing countries have not been major
players in signing PTAs over the estimation period, but they have also been largely insulated
from any investment diversion when their source countries sign PTAs with third parties. And
although many countries in the Latin American group have signed NAFTA-style PTAs with
strong investment provisions, this appears not to have attracted FDI into the region.
Finally, the phenomenal growth of FDI into the Asian region appears not to have been
driven by the investment or services provisions of PTAs signed with their bilateral source
countries. But the network nature of regional investment among the ASEAN-plus-four
means that individual members have been insulated from any investment diversion when their
source countries have signed PTAs with third parties. This is because the investment that the
FDI sources make in third countries can be a general equilibrium complement to bilateral
investment within the overall Asian network.
This last finding is particularly striking. It means that when FDI and trade are
sufficiently driven by fundamentals, in a way that takes advantage of fine divisions of
comparative advantage, but subject to considerations of economies of scale and transport
costs, the resulting network patterns of investment do not need to be boosted by investment
provisions of PTAs. Further, the network patterns can be sufficiently strong to insulate a
country from investment diversion when the FDI source countries play the PTA game
elsewhere. This is in strong contrast with the findings for Latin America. When FDI and trade
are not sufficiently driven by fundamentals, the investment provisions of PTAs signed with
source countries have little real effect.30
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Thus the investment provisions of PTAs pose neither a threat nor a promise to FDI in
the Asian region. But a very real threat may come from the trade provisions of PTAs. In
contrast to investment provisions, the trade provisions do not have generous rules of origin.
PTAs that require ‘substantial transformation’ or 40 per cent value added to ensure that an
exporter is eligible for preferential treatment in the importing country are inimical to fine
divisions of comparative advantage. On this issue, the last word belongs to Victor Fung
(2005):
From a business standpoint, the supply chain should be structured not just to
qualify for favourable ‘rule of origin’ treatment, but in the optimal way to create
a product, namely the most cost-effective way for the final consumer. Why
should I worry about where the point of ‘substantive transformation’ is? Why
should I worry about it occurring in any particular location on order to qualify
for duty-free treatment? The whole world should trade on the basis of
economics. If the future world trading regime is to mirror economic reality and
to allow the use of modern business strategies, we need a single, over-arching
framework for trade.
Data Annex
The FDI data were the same as used by Dee and Gali (2005). The data came from two
sources. The main source was United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) which publishes bilateral investment data for various continents in a series of
volumes.
• Volume 1: World Investment Directory 1992 Asia and the Pacific. Country tables provide data
on FDI flows and stocks for 21 countries during the 1980s (UNCTAD 1992a).
• Volume 2: World Investment Directory 1992 Central and Eastern Europe. Country tables provide
data on FDI flows and stocks for 26 countries during the 1980s (UNCTAD 1992b).
• Volume 3: World Investment Directory 1993 Developed economies. Country tables provide data
on FDI flows and stocks for 22 countries during the 1980s (UNCTAD 1993).
• Volume 4: World Investment Directory 1994 Latin America and the Caribbean. Country tables
provide data on FDI flows and stocks for 24 countries during the 1980s (UNCTAD 1994).31
No. 358, 2006
• Volume 5: World Investment Directory 1996 Africa. Country tables provide data on FDI flows
and stocks for 53 countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s (UNCTAD 1997a).
• Volume 6: World Investment Directory 1996 West Asia. Country tables provide data on FDI flows
and stocks for 15 countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s (UNCTAD 1997b).
• Volume 7: World Investment Directory 2000 Asia and the Pacific. Country tables provide data
on FDI flows and stocks for 23 countries during the 1990s (UNCTAD 2000).
The second source was the OECD, which collects FDI data for OECD reporter
countries and a number of OECD and non-OECD partner countries. For many developed
countries, the OECD data were used to extend the UNCTAD bilateral data which ended at
1991. The OECD data are available electronically. The above UNCTAD investment
directories are not available electronically, although two subsequent ones are. UNCTAD use
a country-specific definition of FDI and the OECD uses a semi-standardised definition of
FDI — the OECD benchmark definition.7 The bilateral FDI data have a number of
limitations.
• There is little consistency in the attribution of nationality to transit investment, i.e. FDI
undertaken by a regional headquarters rather than a parent company.
•  The coverage is limited, even in developed countries.8
• The data are sporadic for developing and under developed countries.
• Stock data are imputed from flows data by simple cumulative addition, with no allowance
for depreciation.
The GDP data measure gross domestic product at purchasing power parity (PPP).
Most of the GDP data were sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI 2001). Insufficient data were available for some economies and some years, and data
were supplemented from the IMF and the OECD (IMF 2001 and OECD 2001).
The GDP data were converted to current international dollars using PPP conversion
factors from the WDI. The data were insufficient for some economies and some years. In
these cases, PPP conversion factors were estimated by extrapolating the data backwards.
GDP at PPP was then calculated by dividing GDP in local currency units by the PPP
conversion factors.
The primary source of the distance data was Boisso and Ferrantino (1997), who
calculate the distance between the two largest cities. Distance is measured in kilometres and32
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is the great circle distance or ‘as the crow flies’. Data were not available for a number of smaller
economies, and data for the missing economies were taken from Haveman (2000), who
measures the distance between capital cities.
The remaining data came from essentially the same sources as Baltagi, Egger and
Pfaffermayr (2005). Capital stock data were estimated using the same perpetual inventory
method as them from data on real gross fixed capital formation taken from WDI. Skilled and
unskilled labour forces were computed by applying skilled and unskilled labour proportions
to total labour force data, where the latter also came from the WDI. Unlike Baltagi, Egger
and Pfaffermayr, the skilled and unskilled labour proportions were taken from the Barro and
Lee data-set (available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html), since this had
better coverage of developing countries than WDI. Skilled labour was defined as those with
‘higher school attained’ (rather than ‘higher school complete’). Country investment risk data
came from the International Country Risk Guide (available at http://www.prsgroup.com/
icrg/icrg.html).
FDI source countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium–Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States.
FDI destination countries: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium–Luxembourg, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Rep),
Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Is, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname,
Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Rep, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad Tobago, Tunisia,
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1 Blonigen (2005) gives a recent comprehensive review of the empirical literature on FDI
determinants.
2 The findings on the effects of host country trade restrictions on FDI have been more
variable. This is not surprising, since theory suggests that the impact of host trade restrictions
on inward FDI is ambiguous.
3 Export platform FDI from d to i would increase with similarity, while horizontal and complex
vertical FDI would increase with the size of d relative to i. However, vertical FDI would
decrease with the d to i size ratio.
4 Content has been scored so that it reflects current commitments for all years in which an
agreement is in force, even if (as in the case of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
and the EC/EU agreement) commitments have become more generous over time. Indeed,
the first sectoral commitments under the ASEAN Framework Agreement were not made
until 1997, two years after the architecture of the agreement was signed. But even on current
commitments, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services scores very poorly on
content, so this feature of the scoring is not expected to influence the results.
5 Note that splitting the sample by source countries gave the same mixed and indeterminate
results as for the sample as a whole.
6 Although Japan is a member of the big eight, it is largely exempt from this assessment because
it had signed no PTAs over the period.
7 Not all OECD countries comply with the OECD benchmark definition, which requires
10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power for investment to be ‘direct’.
The OECD uses the ‘fully consolidated’ system, that is the subsidiary of an subsidiary is
automatically a subsidiary.
8 The UK statistics exclude oil and the financial sector in most years. Given the importance
of the United Kingdom as a financial centre of the world and as an oil trading country, this
leads to a serious underestimation of the United Kingdom’s foreign investment.
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